Major Frontline Report for February 11-17, 2025

"The armor is strong, and our tanks are fast" Article by Marat Khairullin

Surprisingly, none of the seasoned experts paid attention to the second major news of last week. After a brief regrouping, Russian troops launched another phase of a large-scale offensive. Once again, the repeatedly patched defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Velikaya Novosyolka was breached, the encirclement near Andreevka is being liquidated, and the highly dangerous bridgehead near Kupyansk in the Dvurechnaya area continues to expand.

A crucial point: two weeks ago, the capture of Toretsk was officially announced, and this week, the "mopping up" of Chasov Yar is being completed. These two AFU fortresses formed the unified southeastern defensive line of Konstantinovka. The distance between them is approximately 20 kilometers in a straight line—this entire territory is a potential cauldron.

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Currently, our forces are systematically obliterating everything that remains of the AFU defenses in Chasov Yar. It is evident that preparations are underway on the Toretsk-Chasov Yar line for the next phase: a massive offensive on Konstantinovka. This will begin after expanding control over the highway between Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka near Vozdvizhenka. The movement is primarily towards the villages of Tarasovka and further to Aleksandropol (next to Tarasovka, I couldnt make it fit on the map above), with a potential threat to the village of Zarya—forming a second cauldron along the Zarya-Novobakhmutovka-New York-Shcherbinovka line and cutting off the critical H-20 highway. The depth of this operation exceeds 15 kilometers.

Andreevka Cauldron dated February 16th, 2025

When considering the situation alongside the breakthrough near Velikaya Novosyolka and the accelerated liquidation of the Andreevka cauldron, a picture emerges of a future grand operation by the Russian army.

Here, it is essential to understand some details. After the fall of Toretsk, the AFU pulled their best units to Pokrovsk. A similar situation is unfolding after the battle for Chasov Yar—the relatively intact Nazi forces are being redeployed there. Why?

Don’t laugh—the Ukrainian command is valiantly destroying those who weren’t finished off in Toretsk and Chasov Yar in suicidal counterattacks on Kotlino. Of course, they claim success—having captured some warehouses on the outskirts. But their victory celebrations lasted exactly two days. As soon as the frost set in, our forces calmly sent the "suicide squads" to Bandera and restored our positions.

Pokrovsk dated February 11th, 2025

These positions, by the way, are not even decisive today. Notice the detail—while the AFU "valiantly" perished in attacks on Kotlino (labeled Kotlyno on the map above) from the north, the Russian army was methodically crushing the Ukrop defenses on the opposite side of our salient near Udachnoe (Southwest of “Kotlyno”), expanding it.

This episode clearly demonstrates that the AFU is utterly incapable of influencing the implementation of our command’s plans, even on small, isolated sections of the front. From the perspective of the AFU's strategic plans, the redeployment of the remnants of their best troops to Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk indicates that they genuinely believe the main Russian strike will occur here, as a major battle for Pokrovsk looms.

Let me emphasize again—this is the thinking of the single-celled Ukrainian generals, led by the bloodthirsty Syrsky, whose brain has long been replaced by a piece of raw meat. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have killed so many people in senseless operations.

However, the actions of the Russian troops clearly indicate that there will be several main strikes. The first is the battle for Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk. The second is a simultaneous assault on Konstantinovka. The only question is the sequence.

But the most unpleasant thing for the Nazis is that Russia does not intend to stop here. A strike on the flank of the Ukrop’s conditional defensive line along the Kurakhovo-Pokrovsk line is already clearly visible. Our forces are advancing along the entire front from Andreevka to the village of Novy Komar—an offensive zone over thirty kilometers wide. On the southern flank, we need to cover just over 10 kilometers to reach the H-15 highway (the highway just under Novosyolka on the map below, which is labeled as “Novoselka”). Simultaneously, there is movement towards Gulyaipole along the highway connecting it with Novosyolka.

Velikaya Novosyolka direction dated February 16th, 2025

Here, it is worth noting again that the frost has set in, the ground has frozen, and the pace of our advance has accelerated. This is happening on literally all fronts. What does this mean? In the spring, as soon as dry weather sets in, the Ukrainians will have no chance at all. The question is not whether the Ukrainians will stop this flanking strike towards the H-15 highway or not. The question is when our forces will reach the settlements of Bogatyr and Komar on this highway—and from three sides simultaneously.

Reaching this line will mean that the entire front from Kurakhovo to Pokrovsk will turn into the same kind of cauldron as the one between Chasov Yar and Toretsk. Moreover, it is already evident that our forces are preemptively cutting this line into sections near Sribnoe and Novoelizavetovka. Speaking more broadly, our forces are advancing non-stop along all roads leading to the Dnepropetrovsk region in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo sector.

South of Pokrovsk, the front is simply collapsing, and the Ukies, who have concentrated their main forces in Krasnoarmeysk, do not know what to do about it. And here, there is no doubt—as soon as our troops approach Gulyaipole from the northeast, the entire Zaporozhye front will come alive. Let me remind you again—the encirclement of Konstantinovka and Pokrovsk, as well as the collapse of the front from Pokrovsk to Velikaya Novosyolka, are happening simultaneously. And the process is gaining momentum.

Now, let’s think—the frost will eventually end, and the spring mud will also come to an end. And then what? That’s right—the large spring-summer offensive will begin.

It’s interesting to consider what state the bridgehead near Dvurechnaya will be in by then, and what will happen in Kursk Oblast, or more likely, Sumy Oblast! Few doubt that our forces will stop at the border with Ukraine after what the AFU did in Sudzha.

In other words, the dynamics of the fighting show that the winter period on the front was used by our troops for regrouping and preparing for the next phase of the Special Military Operation (SMO).

All of this indicates that it is not in our interest to negotiate or halt hostilities at this time. And, judging purely by the situation on the front, we have no intention of doing so.

But then why did we enter into dialogue with the Americans? That’s right—to buy time and allow our military to finish off the Nazi hydra. Most likely, this is the number one task. And, incidentally, to negotiate something else as well. The initiative is on our side on both tracks—diplomatic and military.

The Americans will likely have to put something very substantial on the table to shift our position. Everything else is just empty talk. They can stomp their shoes in Munich all they want, but the situation on the ground shows that it hasn’t fooled us in the slightest. The main argument is the situation on the front. As for talking—why not? That’s Lavrov’s job.